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Abstract—In this paper we present a new 5-pass
identification scheme with asymptotic cheating
probability 1
2
based on the syndrome decoding
problem. Our protocol is related to the Stern
identification scheme but has a reduced communi-
cation cost compared to previous code-based zero-
knowledge schemes, moreover our scheme permits
to obtain a very low size of public key and secret
key. The contribution of this paper is twofold, first
we propose a variation on the Stern authentication
scheme which permits to decrease asymptotically
the cheating probability to 1/2 rather than 2/3
(and very close to 1/2 in practice) but with less
communication. Our solution is based on deriving
new challenges from the secret key through cyclic
shifts of the initial public key syndrome; a new
proof of soundness for this case is given Secondly
we propose a newway to deal with hashed commit-
ments in zero-knowledge schemes based on Stern’s
scheme, so that in terms of communication, on
the average, only one hash value is sent rather
than two or three. Overall our new scheme has the
good features of having a zero-knowledge security
proof based on well known hard problem of coding
theory, a small size of secret and public key (a
few hundred bits), a small calculation complexity,
for an overall communication cost of 19kb for
authentication (for a 216 security) and a signature
of size of 93kb (11.5kB) (for security 280), an im-
provement of 40% compared to previous schemes
based on coding theory.
Keywords : Zero-knowledge protocols, coding
theory, Stern SD scheme.
I. Introduction
The use of coding theory for public key cryptogra-
phy was initiated by McEliece more than 30 years
ago, although the system has often be considered
as too costly and impractical because of the size
of the public key, code-based cryptography has re-
ceived much more attention in recent years. Besides
the fact that code-based cryptography can possibly
resist to a quantum computer, code-based systems
have also inherent interests: they are very fast and
are usually easy to implement compared to number
theory based systems. Such features make code-based
systems good candidates for low-cost cryptography.
There are two main types of code-based cryp-
tosystems: systems with hidden structure like the
McEliece cryptosystems (analogous to RSA) and
systems with no hidden structure (analogous to dis-
crete log -based cryptosystems) like for instance the
Stern code-based authentication scheme ([Ste93]).
This second type of system is not vulnerable to
structural attacks which are the main cause of at-
tacks on McEliece-like cryptosystems. In practice as
for the Stern scheme, they have not been attacked
beneath the usual improvement on the attack of the
underlying hard problem.
In the case of coding theory the underlying hard
problem (the Syndrome decoding problem SD) is now
well studied and considered as very secure.
Code-based Zero-knowledge authentication
schemes are very interesting since their security
is directly related to a hard problem, moreover
they can be turned into signature schemes through
the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. Meanwhile there are
two strong drawbacks for these schemes. The first
drawback is the size of the public key which can
attain several hundred thousand bits and the second
drawback is the size of the communication induced
by the cheating probability, more than 150kb in
practice for a 280 security level.
The first drawback was resolved in part by Gaborit
and Girault [GG07] who proposed to use structured
matrices like double-circulant matrices (matrices of
the form (IA) for A a random circulant matrix)
to reduce the size of the public key to only a few
hundred bits. The second drawback, the high cost
of communications, largely remains. In this paper we
make a step further to obtain a small communication
cost, our new algorithm, with the same type of
security than previous algorithm and small size of
keys, permits to reduce the size of communications
by 40%. We propose two different improvements, a
first improvement relies on using the double-circulant
structure to increase the number of possible chal-
lenges, and the generic second improvement consists
in a better use of commitment by compressing them.
In practice it is now possible to sign for a security
level of 280 with a signature of size 93kb rather than
155kb, and to get identified for a security level of
2−16 with 20kb rather than 31kb.
II. Background on code-based
authentication schemes
A. Previous work
There are severals protocols based on the syn-
drome decoding problem, we quickly survey the main
advances in this area The first efficient protocol was
proposed by Stern [Ste93]: his idea was a new way
to prove the knowledge of a word with small weight
and fixed syndrome. The idea consist of revealing
one of the three statements, the adequate weight
with a masked syndrome, the adequate syndrome
with a wrong weight or a way the weight and the
syndrome can be masked. The 3 challenges structure
implies a cheating probability equal to 2/3 instead of
1/2 for the well known scheme of Fiat-Shamir. The
Stern protocol is also uncommon by the use of hash
functions. In [Ste93] Stern presents another protocol
which aims at reducing the cheating probability to
1/2 by cutting the challenge step into 2 parts. Indeed,
adding this challenge in the scheme prevents the
prover to reveal the third statement and reduce the
probability close to 1/2. The next improvement was a
reduction of communication due to Ve´ron in [Ve´r96],
the reduction is due to a different formulation of the
secret, which decreases the cost of communication
but increases the size of the key. In [GG07], Gaborit-
Girault proposed to use particular compact matrices
(doubly circulant matrices) in order to obtain a very
short public matrix. The last improvement appeared
with the protocol of Cayrel-Ve´ron-El Yousfi where
the aim was to reduce the cheating probability to 1/2
as well as in the second protocol of Stern but using
fields with cardinality higher than 2. Our protocol
uses the Ve´ron variation that we recall here.
B. Scheme of Veron
private key : (e,m) with e of weight w and of
length n and m a random element of Fk2 .
public key : (G, x,w)) with G a random matrix
of size k × n and x = e+mG.
1) [Commitment Step] P randomly chooses
u ∈ Fk2 and a permutation σ of
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Then P sends to V the com-
mitments c1, c2 and c3 such that :
c1 = h(σ); c2 = h(σ((u +m)G));
c3 = h(σ(uG+ x));
2) [Challenge Step] V sends b ∈ {0, 1, 2} to
P.
3) [Answer Step] Three possibilities :
• if b = 0 : P reveals (u+m) and σ.
• if b = 1 : P reveals σ((u + m)G) and
σ(e).
• if b = 2 : P reveals u and σ.
4) [Verification Step] Three possibilities :
• if b = 0 : V verifies that c1, c2 have
been honestly computed.
• if b = 1 : V verifies that c2, c3
have been honestly computed, and
wt(σ(e)) = w.
• if b = 2 : V verifies that c1, c3 have
been honestly computed.
Fig. 1. Protocol of Veron
III. A new scheme
We now give more details and a high level overview
on our two improvements.
A. High level overview: Increasing the number of
challenges
At the difference of the Fiat-Shamir scheme in
which the cheating probability is 1/2, this probability
is 2/3 for the Stern protocol. It comes from the fact
that proving that a prover knows a codeword of small
weight with a given syndrome, means proving two
facts: the fact that the syndrome of the secret is valid
and the fact that the secret has indeed a small weight.
This situation induces that if one adds a random
commitment there are always two possibilities for
cheating among the three cases, notably since the
attacker knows the syndrome of the secret.
The small weight of the secret is proved by using
a permutation and a bitwise XOR which permit
to retrieve the syndrome thanks to the linearity of
both operations. In all schemes based on syndrome
decoding there is a statement of the form :
σ(e) + v
Here e is the secret of low weight, σ a permutation
and v a mask. In the Ve´ron scheme v is equal to
σ((u +m)G) which is a good mask for σ(e) with u
a random word and v is a random word in the Stern
scheme. The idea described in the scheme of Stern 5
pass [Ste93] and [CVA10] is that a variation of e can
prevent a dependence on v and σ. So there is no need
to test the construction of v and σ at the same time
any more. The cheating probability is now close to
1/2, indeed there is now only two challenges possible
for the second query.
The variation on e can be done in different ways,
Stern used e as a codeword of a Reed-Muller code,
Cayrel et al. used a scalar multiplication, in our
case we use a rotation of the two parts of e. Using
this rotation we can deduce the syndrome of each
permuted word thanks to the propriety of double
circulant codes presented here Let H = [I|A], for A
a circulant matrix of length k and let the syndrome
s = H.yt for y = (y1, y2) For r a cyclic shift on n
positions we obtain:
s = H · (y1, y2)
t ⇔ r(s) = H · (r(y1), r(y2))
t.
Our construction therefore leads to 2k possible
challenges: k coming from the choice of the shift and
2 possibilities for the second query (compared to 3 in
the classical case) An attacker can easily cheats for k
challenges among the 2k possible, and we show that it
is not possible for an attacker to cheat for more than
k + i challenges (for i a security parameter) without
knowing the secret.
This cyclic permutation point of view is an effi-
cient way to reduce the cheating probability close
to 1/2 in a binary scheme and without rising the
communication cost like it was done in the scheme of
Stern 5 pass or considering non binary alphabet like
in Cayrel et al. which also leads to less interesting
communications
B. High level overview: Commitments compression
In Stern’s scheme (or Ve´ron’s scheme), the prover
has first to send 3 commitments composed of 3 hash
of different values: c1, c2 and c3 in Ve´ron’s protocol
(for instance). The sending of these three hashes
comes at a certain cost. Meanwhile one can remark
that if the protocol works well, the Verifier retrieves
2 hash values among the 3 hash values sent. This
remarks shows that in fact it possible to optimize the
manipulation of these commitments. The Prover first
needs to compute the three hash values as usual, but
then rather than sending the three hash values, he
sends a hash of the three hash values. After receiving
the challenge of the Verifier the Prover knows that
the Verifier is able to recover 2 of the 3 hash values,
then he answers to the challenge as usual, but also
adds to his answer the missing hash value.
In the verification step, if all worked correctly the
Verifier is able to recover the first commitment (the
hash of the concatenation of the three hash values
c1, c2 and c3) through the two hashed values he
retrieved and the third one in the answer of the
Verifier. Overall only 2 hash values are sent rather
than 3.
This idea can be generalized to the case of se-
quenced rounds, in that case for each round the
Prover sends only the missing hash value when the
two others are recovered by the Verifier. In that case
only a general commitment for all the rounds needs
to be sent: a hash value of the sequence of all hash
values of the different rounds. This point of view is
very efficient in particular for signature for which the
average number of hash values sent per round drops
from 3 to 1
Moreover this way of proceeding in secure in the
random oracle model, since an error in the final hash
value implies an error in one of the hash of the round
sequence
C. Description of the protocol
We use the same notations and the same keys as
in the scheme of Veron.
private key : (e,m) with e of weight w and of
length n and m a random element of Fk2 .
public key : (G, x,w)) with G a random matrix
of size k × n and x = e+mG.
For simplicity matter we describe the protocol in
figure 2 only for the first improvement since the
second one is generic.
The verification protocol consists in a reconstruc-
tion of the hash value committed to the first step of
the algorithm. In the first case, the first and the third
hash values can be constructed and in the second case
it concerns the second and the third hash values. The
construction of hash value are obvious except c3 in
the b = 0 case using the two answers, the word u
and the permutation σ. We just have to see that
c3 = σ(uG + xr), with x the public key shifted r
times.
IV. Security
In this section we first prove the ZK security of our
scheme by using the usual zero-knowledge arguments
and we also consider practical security.
1) [First commitment Step] P randomly
chooses u ∈ Fk and a permutation σ of
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Then P sends to V the com-
mitments c1 and c2 such that :
c1 = h(σ); c2 = h(σ(uG));
2) [First part of the challenge] V sends a
value 0 ≤ r ≤ k − 1 (number of shifted
positions) to P .
3) [Final commitment Step] P build er =
Rotr(e) and sends the last part of the
commitment :
c3 = h(σ(uG+ er))
4) [Challenge Step] V sends b ∈ {0, 1} to P.
5) [Answer Step] Two possibilities :
• if b = 0 : P reveals (u+mr) and σ.
• if b = 1 : P reveals σ(uG) and σ(er)
where er = Rotr(e).
6) [Verification Step] Two possibilities :
• if b = 0 : V verifies that c1, c3 have
been honestly computed.
• if b = 1 : V verifies that c2, c3 have
been honestly computed. and that the
weight of σ(er) is w.
Fig. 2. New double-circulant protocol
A. Completeness
The completeness is clear at the moment that
we notice that the sending of the prover permit to
generate the corresponding hash value. It’s pretty
clear when wee see the verification scheme.
B. Soundness
We prove here that a malicious prover cannot
be authenticated with probability much higher than
1
2 . We introduce a new parameter i to compute a
trade-off between the cheating probability, security
cost and communication cost. The idea of the proof
is to prove that someone who can anticipate more
than k + i challenges can also retrieve the secret
key with a good probability, depending on i. We use
the verification algorithm of the protocol to obtain
necessarily conditions for cheating. The end of the
proof consists in choosing a high enough parameter i
such that, with a good probability the only solution
with a good condition is the secret key.
Theoreme IV.1 If a prover B is able to be ac-
cepted by a verifier with a probability upper than
k+i
2k , B can retrieve the secret key of the protocol
from the public one with a probability greater than,
1 − 2
n−k
−i
(2n−k+n−1)i
(
n
w
)i
, or find a collision for the hash
function in polynomial time.
Sketch of proof :
Suppose a malicious prover M is able to answer k+i
challenges. By the pigeonhole principle he is able to
answer 2i challenges of the form {(rj , b), 1 ≤ j ≤ i
and b ∈ {0, 1}}. Rewriting the commitment c3 in
two differents ways shows that he is able to construct
a (i+1)-uplet (c, z1, . . . , zi) solution of the following
problem :
srj = c+H · z
t
j (1)
with wt(zj) = w, srj the syndrome of the public
key x shifted by rj positions, c a constant vector and
1 ≤ j ≤ i.
The next step consists in reducing the solutions of the
problem (1) by increasing the value of the parameter
i. We use probabilities to evaluate the size of the set
of solutions and more particularly, the distribution of
syndrome of words of weight w for a double circulant
code with adequate length, see [GZ08]. We deduce
that a random tuple (c, z1, . . . , zi) with zj a word
of fixed weight w for 1 ≤ j ≤ i satisfies the set of
equations (1) with probability equal to 1
2n−k+n−1
. A
careful probability analysis gives the bound described
in the theorem. This probability depends on i which
is the number of conditions.
Notice that the tuple (0, z1, . . . , zi) is a solution of
the equation 1 with zj equal to the secret key shifted
by block for 1 ≤ j ≤ i. Since we choose i such that
the shifted secret key is the unique solution with a
very strong probability, therefore a malicious prover
who knows how to answer in k + i cases under 2k
will be able to retrieve the secret key with a shift by
block with a very strong probability (in practice the
probability is chosen up to 1− 2−80).
C. Zero-Knowledge
This part of the proof consists in proving that no
information can be deduce in polynomial time from
an execution of the protocol more than the knowledge
of the public data. The idea is to prove that anyone
can build a simulator of the protocol in polynomial
time such that the result of the simulator cannot be
distinguished from a real execution.
The simulator is build by anticipation by the chal-
lenges, for each round it is possible to make a valid
instance by anticipation of the challenge b only. This
implies a construction in twice the number of rounds
of the protocol.
The case b = 0 can be anticipated by the choice of
σ
′
a random permutation, v a random word, h1 =
hash(σ
′
) and h3 = hash(σ
′
(vG + xr)). We notice
that (v,σ
′
) and (u+mr,σ) are indistinguishable. The
case b = 1 can be anticipated by the choice of v
and z such as z is a word of weight w, v = pi(uG)
with pi a random permutation, u a random word,
h2 = hash(v) and h3 = hash(v + z). We notice that
(v,z) and (σ(uG),σ(er)) are indistinguishable.
The construction’s cost of the simulator is negligible
and does not affect the security parameters. When
we use the commitment compression improvement
the proof is different because of the complexity cost
of anticipation, in this case the construction’s cost
of the simulator is not negligible and it is more in-
teresting to produce this improvement several times
instead of one to not affect the security too much.
D. Practical security of double circulant codes
At the difference of the original Stern’s scheme,
our protocol is based on decoding a random double-
circulant matrix (SD-DC problem say), this problem
at the difference of the SD problem, is not proven
NP-hard (although a result is known on the hardness
of decoding general quasi-cyclic codes). Meanwhile in
our case the problem appears to be hard since : 1) it
has been proven in [GZ08] that random double circu-
lant codes rely on the GV bound, 2) it is not known,
even with very structured codes, how to decode a
code up to the GV bound in polynomial time and
at last, 3), in practice, there is no known specialized
algorithm which can do significantly better (besides a
small linear factor n) for solving the SD-DC problem.
The situation is the same than for lattices and ideal
lattices compared to random lattices. In practice the
best known algorithm to attack the SD-DC problem
are the same than those for the SD problem ([FS09]).
V. Parameters for authentication and
signature
According to the security constraints for zero-
knowledge discuss earlier we choose as parameters
n = 698, k = 349, i = 19, w = 70 for a security in 281
and a probability of cheating in 2−16.
For a security in 2100 we choose n = 838, k =
419, i = 20, w = 86 and for a security in 2128 we
have n = 1094, k = 547, i = 14, w = 109.
• For signature, and a probability of cheating in
280 it is sufficient to multiply by 5 the previous
TABLE I
”Comparison between ZK scheme for a 2−16 cheating
probability”
Stern 3 Stern 5
Rounds 28 16
Matrix size (bits) 122500 122500
Public Id (bits) 350 2450
Secret key (bits) 700 4900
Communication (bits) 42019 62272
Prover’s Computation 222.7op. inF2 221.92op. inF2
Veron CVE New protocol
28 16 18
122500 32768 350
700 512 700
1050 1024 700
35486 31888 20080
222.7op. inF2 216mult. inF256 221op. inF2
data. Overall our double-circulant scheme permits to
obtain a signature of length 93kb.
Remark: it is possible to decrease even more
the communication cost by using a constant weight
encoding when sending σ(er), the cost is then k
bits rather than 2k bits, overall it decreases the
authentication to 17kb and the signature to 79kb,
but the encoding comes with a complexity price.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we propose a new variation on Stern’s
authentication scheme. Our protocol permits to ob-
tain a gain of more than 40% compared to previous
schemes and it is the first code based zero knowledge
scheme to obtain a signature length of less than
100kb with strong security and small size of keys.
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